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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this research is to examine whether corporate governance changes along the 
corporate life-cycle.    
Design/methodology/approach – In a sample of 205 firms from 21 emerging market countries and 
using a life-cycle proxy from the dividends literature, we use a governance-prediction model which examines 
whether corporate governance differs along the corporate life-cycle.   
Findings – Mature firms tend to practice better overall corporate governance. Discipline and 
independence improve as firms mature. Firms tend to be most transparent and accountable when they are 
young. These findings suggest that the resource/strategy and monitoring/control governance functions 
are relevant but at different life-cycle stages.   
Research limitations/implications – In the absence of longitudinal governance data with sufficient 
coverage to track within-firm changes in corporate governance along the corporate life-cycle, we analyze 
differences in corporate governance between-firms at different life-cycle stages.  
Originality/value – We use an alternative, yet new measure from the dividends literature to account for 
the firm’s position along the corporate life-cycle. With this new measure, our findings are in line with the 
predictions of Filatotchev et al. (2006).   
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1. Introduction 
In the last ten years or so, much attention has been devoted to the study of corporate 
governance. For example, a search of “empirical corporate governance” in SSRN returns 1,377 studies. 
This work has been made possible by the availability of corporate governance measures, which makes 
comparisons of governance quality between firms, in and across countries, possible (e.g., Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA (2001)), Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), and the modified Gompers et al. 
(2003) “G-Index” of Bebchuk et al. (2009) (i.e. the “E-Index”)).1  
Two lines of inquiry which has attracted much attention are governance-to-value and governance-
prediction studies. The former examines whether a causal relationship exists between corporate governance 
and firm value (e.g., Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2009, 2011; and Black 
et al. 2006a). The latter seeks to identify the firm- and country-level factors which shape corporate 
governance practices in firms (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005, Black et al. 2006; 
and Doidge et al. 2007). While these studies are unlikely to be completely free from concerns relating to 
endogeneity, they typically conclude that governance causes value, and a range of country- and firm-level 
factors determine corporate governance choice (see Black et al, 2012). The collective findings suggest 
that, among others, large, high growth firms, with a need for external finance are better-governed, but 
that firms that exhibit these characteristics may not practice better governance in countries where the 
benefits of adopting better-governance do not outweigh the costs of doing so (see Doidge et al. 2007).  
Notwithstanding the voluminous nature of corporate governance research, one aspect that has 
been largely neglected in the literature is, whether and to what extent, governance evolves along the 
corporate life-cycle. In fact the scarcity of work in this specific area led Filatotchev et al. (2006, p.257 and 
274) to assert that:  
“Much attention has been focused on the largest mature companies listed on a stock market, 
concentrating on the static theorising of the principal-agent perspective. Less attention has therefore been 
paid to the change processes in governance and variations in the principal-agent relationship through the 
life-cycle of the firm from inception to maturity…, and that analysis of the post-IPO evolution of the 
firm’s governance system is a key research issue”  
                                                 
1 Others that construct their own corporate governance indices include Black et al. (2006, 2006a, 2012), and 
Aggarwal et al. (2008). Aggarwal et al. (2008) use 44 of the 64 ISS (2005) governance attributes to compare the 
governance practices of U.S. and non-U.S. firms.    
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In defence of researchers, the dearth of work in this area is in large part due to the nature of the 
data on offer. Consider the type of data required to undertake such an exercise. The researcher requires a 
measure of the strength of corporate governance from corporate inception through to maturity and 
beyond.2 There are a number of issues here. First, much of the governance data on offer is for publicly-
traded firms only. A second issue relates to the duration of governance data for individual firms post-
IPO. To the best of our knowledge, no governance measure exists which offers the scope to track 
corporate governance quality from the IPO stage (or earlier) through the growth stage to maturity, and 
beyond (i.e. stagnation and decline). For example, the G-Index covers four years, while the governance-
index of Black et al. (2006a) dates from 1999 to 2005. The underlying issue here is that while these 
governance-indices are well-suited to the study of governance in calendar time (e.g. Di Nicolo et al, 2008), 
none are perfectly tailored to the study of corporate governance over the entire corporate life-cycle, since 
for many firms, the firm life-cycle is much longer than the coverage of most, if not all, governance indices 
(see Miller and Friesen, 1984). 
With this in mind, we adopt what we believe to be a next-best approach. We use governance data 
for a sample of firms from emerging markets, and seek to identify differences in corporate governance 
practices for firms who, at a particular point in time (2001), are at different life-cycle stages.3 In this 
regard, our paper is materially different to others. Others examine the firm- and country-level factors 
which shape the governance practices of firms at a particular point in time.4 We examine whether these 
firms, whom are at different life-cycle stages, have different governance practices. Given the nature of our 
governance data, we do not, nor cannot, track within-firm changes in governance along the entire corporate 
life-cycle. Instead, our focus is on identifying differences in governance practices between firms. Filatotchev 
et al. (2006) outline a framework which hypothesizes that as firms progress along their life-cycle, so too 
does their corporate governance function, as various aspects of governance facilitates wealth creation and 
preservation at different life-cycle stages. The governance data we use is suited to test the predictions of 
Filatotchev et al. (2006), because it covers broad aspects of governance, for example, independence, 
                                                 
2 Helwege et al. (2007) examine the evolution of one aspect of internal-governance, namely insider ownership from 
the IPO and beyond.   
3 We do so since we do not have access to other governance data sources.  
4 An exception is Braga-Alves and Morey (2012) who examine whether changes in firm and country-level 
characteristics lead changes in governance.    
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accountability, and transparency which are cornerstones of the conceptual framework which Filatotchev 
et al. (2006) develop. A governance index with a much narrower focus (e.g. the G-Index focuses almost 
exclusively in anti-takeover provisions) would make such an empirical exercise impossible.         
To identify firms at different stages of their life-cycle, we use a measure from the dividend 
literature. DeAngelo et al. (2006) test the life-cycle model of dividends using the ratio of earned (retained) 
to total equity (or total assets) as a proxy for firm maturity. As firms mature, the contribution of earned 
equity to total equity (earned plus contributed equity) increases, since as firms mature, they become more 
profitable, have less growth opportunities, and generate greater cashflow from operations, which all 
results in an increase in earned equity, and a reduced reliance on contributed (external) equity. We 
examine how corporate governance changes, if at all, as the firm matures, using the DeAngelo et al. 
(2006) measure to account for the firm life-cycle.  
Using a governance-prediction model, we show that governance quality improves as firms mature. 
Transparency, independence and accountability are all prominent at different, but not necessarily the 
same life-cycle stages. Our findings suggest that a policy which mandates a “one-size-fits-all” governance 
code will not fit with the needs of all firms in that country, and in some instances, will expose some firms 
to the costs of adhering to certain governance provisions whose adoption would not prove to be 
beneficial. Our findings do not necessarily suggest that “across the board” rules are not beneficial 
(Atanasov et al. (2010) say they can be). Our findings suggest that a more flexible approach which grants 
firms more discretion over their own governance choices, say for example, along the lines of “comply or 
explain” would seem to make more sense.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the 
data, section 4 the methodology, and section 5 discusses our findings. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Related Literature 
Our paper is positioned within a field of corporate governance commonly referred to as 
governance-prediction studies. These studies use firm-level governance rankings, performed either using a 
number of countries (e.g. Klapper and Love (2004)) or using individual country case-studies (e.g. Black et 
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al. (2006)) to determine the firm- and country-level factors which predict corporate governance practices 
in firms.  
The firm-level variables typically include size, growth opportunities, external financing need, asset 
tangibility, and whether a firm is cross-listed abroad (in the U.S.). Some add research and development 
expenditures, and exports to this list. Doidge et al. (2007) also include the cash holdings of firms and the 
ownership structure of the firm. Black et al. (2006) use the richest set of firm-level attributes. They also 
use firm risk, leverage, profitability, market share, capital expenditures, and advertising. With some 
exceptions, these studies find that large, growing firms, with an external financing need, large cash 
positions, and who are riskier, are better-governed. Cross-listing firms are better-governed. Profitability 
and asset tangibility substitute for governance.  
The country-level variables used capture aspects of financial and legal development. Country 
(rule of law and/or country shareholder rights) and corporate governance complement one another. 
Doidge et al. (2007) demonstrate that financial development matters for corporate governance, since poor 
financial development prevents firms from practicing better governance because the benefits from doing 
so (e.g. raising equity capital on liquid equity markets) do not outweigh the costs. Hugill and Siegel (2012) 
suggest that country-level factors do not dominate firm-level characteristics to the extent to which 
Doidge et al. (2007) say they do.  
Individually and collectively, these studies enhance our understanding of what determines the 
governance practices of firms. However, one drawback is that their focus is narrow and static, and fails to 
examine how governance changes as firms change, or specifically, how governance changes as firms move 
along their life-cycle. They do include firm-level variables. However, different firm-level characteristics 
imply differing relationships between corporate governance and the firm life-cycle. For example, consider 
the effects of profitability and external financing need on the governance practices of firms. All else equal, 
governance quality increases (decreases) in a firms external finance need (profitability). However, when 
firms are “immature” they are typically unprofitable, with a large external finance need, which tends to 
reverse when firms mature. This then implies that, all else equal, firms practice better governance when 
they are “immature” and governance quality deteriorates as they mature. On the other hand, the free cash 
flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986, 1993) suggests that the agency costs of free cash flow are most severe 
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when firms are mature. Thus, one could argue then, that along the lines of Jensen (1986, 1993), 
governance quality should be the greatest when agency conflicts are most acute, that is, when firms are 
mature. Filatotchev et al. (2006) also allude to the greater need required of the monitoring role of 
governance as firms mature. Thus, we tend to agree with the assertion of Filatotchev et al. that an analysis 
of corporate governance across the life-cycle of the firm is an important avenue of research. It appears to 
us at least, that based on the existing empirical evidence, a question remains regarding the nature of the 
relationship between a firms governance practices and its life-cycle.  
 
3. Data 
We use the corporate governance scores developed by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 
2001), which range from a low of 0 to a high of 100. Higher values suggest better governance. All ratings 
are calculated in 2001. The rating for each individual firm, for which there are 495 in total across 25 
countries, is a composite measure of 57 qualitative, binary questions which span seven distinct 
governance categories, namely management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, fairness (all have a 15% weighting), and social awareness (10% weight). We use the first six 
governance provisions to construct the composite governance measure. Filatotchev et al. (2006) 
differentiate between the strategic/resource and monitoring/control functions of governance.5 Five 
(excluding transparency) of the six CLSA governance provisions relate to monitoring and control. Two 
provisions, namely independence and accountability, likely capture both the resource/strategy and 
monitoring/control functions, since both measures account for different characteristics of the board of 
directors.  
 We use a measure from the dividend literature to proxy for a firm’s position along their 
corporate life-cycle (or firm maturity), namely the ratio of earned equity (retained earnings) to total assets 
(see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Brockman and Unlu, 2011). Mature (Immature) firms are characterized with 
high (low, mostly negative) ratios of earned equity to total assets and earned equity to total equity. Since 
we use public firms alone, our analysis is restricted to how governance changes between quadrants 2 
                                                 
5 Of course, resource and strategy are not the same. However, we group them together here as they should be 
prominent at the same life-cycle stages (see Filatotchev et al. (2006)).  
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(post-IPO young firms) and quadrant 3 (mature firms) of the Filatotchev et al. (2006) framework.6 The 
retained earnings (to total assets) and other unreported variables, namely dividend payout, profitability, 
external financing dependence, and free cash flow all suggest that there are firms in our sample in both 
quadrants 2 and 3. For example, consider Table 3 which divides our sample of firms into quartiles. 
Quartile 1 firms have negative RE/TA (reported), pay no dividend, have a large external financing need 
and are unprofitable (all unreported). As we proceed from quartile 2 to quartile 4, firms mature (i.e. 
RE/TA increases). They initiate and continue to pay larger dividends, have positive free cash flow, no 
longer rely as much on external finance, and are profitable (all unreported). Finally, the RE/TE (and 
RE/TA) measure is consistent with the resource-based view of the firm, which is interrelated to the firms 
governance function, and is also consistent with the notion of the firm’s financial life-cycle (see 
Filatotchev et al. (2006)).  
We control for a number of determinants of corporate governance, commonly employed in other 
studies (see literature review for references). The firm-level controls are firm size, growth, profitability, 
cash holdings, dependence on external finance, and a cross-listing (in the U.S. (in 2001)) dummy variable. 
All information on U.S. cross-listings is sourced from the Bank of New York-Mellon 
(www.adrbnymellon.com), and cross-referenced with data from Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr). We 
group all 66 cross-listing firms together, rather than differentiate by listing type. All firm-level variables 
are sourced from Worldscope and a description of each is provided in Appendix 1. Based on the existing 
evidence, size is expected to be positively related to governance. Growing firms with a dependence on 
external finance invest in governance. In contrast, self-financing, profitable firms have little need to 
follow suit. Recent evidence suggests that poorly-governed firms hold more cash than well-governed 
firms (see Ammann et al., 2011). Cross-listing firms are expected to be better-governed than non-cross-
listing firms, although it is not clear whether better governance is a prerequisite to, or a consequence of 
cross-listing. The difference in governance quality between firms may be evident prior to cross-listing (see 
Wojcik et al., 2005), but for firms cross-listing in the U.S. as Level 2 or Level 3 exchange-traded ADRs, 
the bonding hypothesis suggests that their governance is likely to improve once they cross-list (see Stulz, 
1999; Coffee, 1999, 2002).  
                                                 
6 In quadrants 1 and 4, firms are privately-held.   
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We use four country-level determinants of corporate governance, namely stock market 
development; (country) shareholder rights, culture and economic development (see Appendix 1 for a full 
description of each variable). Country and corporate governance tend to complement each other (see 
Klapper and Love, 2004), while firms reap larger benefits from improved governance where stock 
markets and the economy is highly developed (see Doidge et al, 2007; Aggarwal et al. 2009). Griffin et al. 
(2013) find that culture is positively related to corporate governance.  
Our final sample of 205 publicly-traded firms is outlined in Table 1. Taiwan (31) provides the 
most firms. Argentina, Hungary, Peru, and Poland provide a single firm each. The median (MED) and 
standard deviation (SD) retained earnings (to total assets) suggest that firms are most mature (and at 
much later stages of their life-cycle) in Mexico and Malaysia, and least so in Brazil. 7  The greatest variation 
in firm maturity tends to occur in Hong Kong. Governance quality is highest in Mexico, but less so in 
Pakistan. Hong Kong (13) and Taiwan (12) provide the largest number of cross-listing firms. Stock 
markets tend to be developed in Hong Kong, but less so in Pakistan. Shareholder rights are strong in, 
among others, Brazil and Chile, and weak in China. Individualism prevails in Hungary, collectivism in 
Colombia. Hong Kong and Singapore are the most developed economies in our sample.     
Table 2 outlines the country sample median and standard deviation for each individual corporate 
governance component. Firms tend to be most transparent (TPY) in Chile, and opaque in Pakistan. 
Discipline (DIS) is high in Turkey, but not so in Poland. The median firm in Singapore scores highly 
across all aspects of governance. In contrast, the median firm in Pakistan scores poorly across all six 
governance components. In some countries, the median firm scores highly in some governance measures, 
but not so in others (e.g. Hong Kong).   
 
4. Methodology 
In this section, we explore the relationship between firm maturity (life-cycle) and corporate 
governance practices. Consider Table 3. Here we divide our sample of firms into four quartiles based on 
RE/TA. From lowest to highest quartile, the average (median) ratio of retained earnings (to total assets) 
changes from -0.157 (0.003) to 0.466 (0.432) (see top panel of Table 3). For the average and median firm, 
                                                 
7 To conserve space, we do not report the summary retained earnings to total equity statistics.   
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corporate governance improves with RE/TA (see middle and bottom panels of Table 3). For the median 
firm, corporate governance improves from 51.68 in quartile 1 to 61.95 in quartile 4. The improvement in 
governance over the life-cycle results from improvements in discipline, independence, responsibility, and 
fairness. Transparency is highest at either ends of the firm-maturity spectrum, while firms are most 
accountable when they are immature (Quartile 1).  
In Tables 4 and 5, we examine whether these same relationships hold once we control for firm, 
industry, and country-level determinants of corporate governance. To do so, we estimate a series of 
ordinary and weighted least squares regressions, which regress corporate governance on our corporate 
life-cycle measure, and a full set of firm, industry (based on four-digit SIC codes) and country-level 
controls. All regressions are estimated with heteroscedastic-consistent robust standard errors. In the 
bottom panels of Tables 4 and 5, we estimate a series of weighted least squares regressions to alleviate 
concerns that our findings are driven by differences in the number of firms across countries. In the 
weighted least squares regressions, the weight of each observation (firm) is the inverse of the number of 
observations in each country, so that each country receives an equal weighting.  
Our governance prediction model is unlikely to be completely free from endogeneity concerns. 
First, there is the issue of omitted-variable bias. The issue here is that corporate governance is likely to be 
correlated with a number of firm/country-level variables, which in turn are likely to be correlated with 
each other. If we exclude a (relevant) variable, which is correlated with both firm life-cycle (RE/TA) and 
corporate governance, then we may incorrectly infer that the firm life-cycle and governance are related, 
where in fact, they are only related through their common relationship with the omitted variable. To try 
and alleviate some of this concern, we include a rich set of control variables. Given the nature of the 
corporate governance data that we use, and even with the inclusion of a number of (observable) control 
variables, we are, nevertheless, unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Second, and also of 
concern is the notion of reverse causality. Rather than firm maturity predicting governance, governance 
may in fact predict firm-maturity. For example, if we allude to the corporate life-cycle stages of Miller and 
Friesen (1984) (the stages are birth, growth, maturity, revival, and decline phases), better-governance may 
facilitate the transition from the birth to the growth stage since better governance helps to reduce the cost 
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of capital. Since we lack a suitable instrument for corporate governance and use cross-sectional 
governance data, we cannot address these concerns in this paper.         
 
5. Results and discussion 
Consider Table 4. The coefficient estimates suggest that mature firms practice better corporate 
governance. In all six regressions the coefficient estimates on the firm life-cycle variable is positive, and is 
statistically significant in five of the six cases. The last column of Table 4 calculates the effect that a two 
standard deviation change in each independent variable has on corporate governance (see column labelled 
Ec. Sig). Economic significance is calculated based on the average absolute coefficient estimate for each 
variable. For firm maturity (life-cycle), the change in governance is 3.08, which implies a 5.52% change in 
governance practices for the median firm (i.e., 3.08/55.82)*100).8 These findings are at odds with Black et 
al. (2006) who find that the governance practices of Korean firms are unaffected by the number of years 
listed on the stock exchange.  
In contrast to both Klapper and Love (2004) and Black et al. (2006), we find that smaller firms 
are better-governed. Interestingly, neither profitability nor growth is significantly related to corporate 
governance. With one exception, both are of the correct sign, but remain statistically insignificant. Better-
governed firms hold more cash than their not so well-governed counterparts. As expected, dependence 
on external finance is positively related to corporate governance, although it is only statistically significant 
in one of three regressions. External financing need is also statistically insignificant in the regressions of 
Durnev and Kim (2005) and Black et al. (2006). Cross-listing firms are better governed than non-cross-
listing firms, on average by 6.07, which represents a governance premium of 11.05% over the median 
non-cross-listed firm (i.e. (6.07/54.93)*100)). Where all four country-level variables are included 
simultaneously, only culture and economic development are statistically significant. The positive 
coefficient estimate on culture confirms the findings of Griffin et al. (2013). Governance is not 
necessarily better in more individualistic countries. Rather, the positive coefficient suggests that 
governance ratings do a better job at capturing the governance attributes of firms in countries with a 
culture of individualism. Finally, the weighted least squares regressions confirm our earlier predictions 
                                                 
8 Our findings are qualitatively the same we use RE/TE and dividend payout (dividends to total assets) in place of 
RE/TA. This analysis is available from the corresponding author upon request.       
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that mature firms practice better governance.  Filatotchev et al. (2006) show that as firms mature from 
quadrant 2 to 3, the resource/strategy role of governance becomes less relevant, while the 
monitoring/control function becomes more important. Our findings suggest that the declining relevance 
of resource/strategy function is more than offset by the prominence of monitoring/control as firms 
mature, resulting in higher overall governance. In the next section, we examine this issue in much greater 
detail (see Tables 5 and 6).        
Table 5 presents a series of weighted least squares regressions. The dependent variable is one of 
the six individual corporate governance provisions described previously. Since growth and profitability are 
unrelated to governance, we exclude them from Table 5. We present estimates with and without country 
fixed-effects. The coefficient estimates suggest that discipline, independence, responsibility, and fairness 
are positively and statistically related to the corporate life-cycle. These findings are all consistent with 
Filatotchev et al. (2006). Unexpectedly, the coefficient estimates on the transparency and accountability 
measures are statistically significant. From an economic significance viewpoint, changes in discipline 
(20.71) matter the most, followed by fairness (10.35) and independence (9.86). Interestingly, the control 
variables affect the individual governance provisions differently. For example, firms with a need for 
external finance score highly in terms of discipline and transparency. Cross-listing firms score higher than 
their non-cross-listing counterparts in terms of discipline, transparency, responsibility and fairness. 
In Table 6 we examine how corporate governance and its individual components change along the 
corporate life-cycle, but now using the same life-cycle (retained earnings) quartiles created in Table 2. This 
analysis potentially provides a much richer picture of how corporate governance evolves along the 
corporate life-cycle, since it does not impose the same linear constraint as in Tables 4 and 5. It also 
facilitates a more direct comparison with Filatotchev et al. (2006).     
In all regressions, the reference group is Quartile 1 (from Table 3). The coefficient estimates 
reveal the following. First, the improvement in governance that we observe in Table 4 only comes about 
for the most mature firms (Q4 firms). For Q4 firms, the coefficient is positive (2.016) and statistically 
significant. On inspection of the components of governance, it is evident that this improvement in overall 
governance comes about through improvements in corporate discipline and independence, both of which 
capture aspects of monitoring and control. In both instances, governance is at its highest for Q4 firms. 
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For example, in the case of discipline, the coefficient estimate for Q4 firms is 8.850. Given that average 
discipline for Q1 firms is 43.39, this implies that discipline is 20.40% i.e. (8.850/43.39) *100, higher for 
Q4 when compared to Q1 firms. Using independence, the coefficient estimate for Q4 firms is 10.566. 
This implies that independence is 19.19% i.e. (10.566/55.05)*100 higher for Q4 than for Q1 firms. We 
find that firms tend to be most transparent and accountable at early stages of their (public) life-cycle i.e. 
Q1 firms, and both transparency and accountability deteriorates as firms mature. The coefficient 
estimates suggest that Q1 firms are more transparent and independent when compared to Q4 firms in the 
region of 19.20% (i.e. (11.808/61.488)*100) and 21.14% (i.e. (10.469/49.528)*100), respectively.  
To put our findings in perspective, we need to elaborate on the predictions of Filatotchev et al. 
(2006). They differentiate between the resource/strategy and monitoring/control functions of 
governance. In our paper, five of our six individual CLSA governance provisions (All except 
transparency) likely capture aspects of monitoring/control, while accountability and independence likely 
capture both the resource/strategy and monitoring/control functions. Since, we only observe publicly-
traded firms (i.e. quadrants 2 and 3), then, a priori, and according to Filatotchev et al. (2006), we should 
observe lower transparency, greater monitoring (all individual governance components excluding 
transparency), and a reduced role for the resource/strategy aspect of governance as firms evolve from 
quadrants 2 to 3. Since accountability and independence likely capture both the resource/strategy and 
monitoring/control functions, how they change as the firm evolves is ambiguous.  
Our findings are in line with Filatotchev et al. (2006). First, they suggest that as firms mature the 
monitoring role of governance increases as enhanced monitoring “widens the firm’s access to the 
financial resource base as it matures and exploits strategic opportunities” (see Filatotchev et al. (2006, pg. 
260)). Discipline, independence, and fairness all improve along the life-cycle, which are important aspects 
of the monitoring/control functions of governance. Second, we also observe the deterioration in 
corporate transparency that Filatotchev et al. (2006) predict will occur from quadrants 2 to 3. Reduced 
transparency manifests as “managerial rent-seeking opportunities increase, rendering the governance 
system less transparent” (see Filatotchev et al. (2006, pg. 260). Third, corporate independence (of the 
board) increases as the firm matures, which is in line with the predictions of Filatotchev et al. (2006). 
Since board independence captures aspects of both resource/strategy and monitoring/control, our 
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finding that boards become more independent as firms mature suggest that the reduced 
resource/strategic role played by the board of directors is more than offset by the greater monitoring that 
they now provide. Finally, we observe that accountability deteriorates as the firm matures. Since, like the 
independence measure, accountability captures both aspects of resource/strategy and 
monitoring/control, what we are most-likely capturing here is the decreased importance in the 
resource/strategy role of governance. In summary, our findings do appear to highlight that the 
monitoring, and to a lesser extent, the resource/strategy functions of governance change as the firm 
evolves along its life-cycle. The net result is that overall governance is greatest for mature firms.        
Our findings contribute to the debate on how governance rules should be implemented. In some 
instances, governance standards are implemented across the board, and thus assume that these rules suit 
and benefit all firms equally. Examples include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., the listing rules on the 
New York Stock Exchange, and the OECD principles on corporate governance. While there is evidence 
which says that the implementation of “across the board” rules can work (see Atanasov et al., 2010)), 
there also exists some evidence that suggests that they may not. For example, “across the board” stock 
exchange listing requirements do not equally-benefit all firms. Specifically, the fact that many firms cross-
delisted from the U.S. post Sarbanes-Oxley (see Marosi and Massoud, 2008), and that many cross-listing 
firms, particularly from emerging markets, choose to list in the U.S., but not on the New York Stock 
Exchange (see Boubakri et al., 2010), suggests that the costs of adhering to these additional legal rules 
may prove not to be beneficial for all. Furthermore, as illustrated by Hope et al. (2013), many firms that 
choose to cross-list in the U.S. as Level 1 and Rule 144a issues, voluntarily disclose more after they cross-
list. This line of reasoning points to a more flexible approach to governance adoption. Other examples 
include “comply-or-explain” as adopted in Australia and the U.K. for example, or permitting firms to list 
on different segments of the stock exchange, which is common place in Brazil (see Braga-Alves and 
Shastri (2011)). Our findings suggest that a policy which mandates a “one-size-fits-all” governance code 
for all firms in a country will not fit with the needs of all firms in that country. While the adoption of 
“across the board” rules have proven to be beneficial in some countries, a more flexible approach which 
grants firms more discretion over their own governance choices, say for example, along the lines of 
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“comply or explain” would seem to make more sense, a policy prescription which has important 
implications for the regulatory function in a country.     
 
6. Conclusion 
Much of the discussion in the corporate governance literature in recent years concerns the debate 
about whether a “one-size-fits-all” approach is appropriate or whether governance practices, which are 
dictated by a number of firm and country factors, and their interaction, should be tailored to the specific 
needs of individual firms. While the debate is ongoing, Black et al. (2012) present some compelling 
evidence in support of the latter, and in doing so, propose a flexible governance model, which permits 
each firm to choose what they believe to their own “optimal” level of governance.   
One of the reasons that firms are likely to have very different governance needs at any one point 
in time is because these firms are likely to be at very different stages in their life-cycle. In turn, firms at 
different stages of their life-cycle are likely to have very different governance needs, since the wealth 
creation and protection functions of corporate governance change as the firm matures (see Filatotchev et 
al. (2006)).   
 In this paper we explore the relationship between corporate governance practices and the 
corporate life-cycle. Since we are restricted to the use of cross-sectional governance measures, our focus 
is on identifying differences in corporate governance quality between firms who are at different stages of 
their life-cycle. We proxy for a firm’s position along their life-cycle using the life-cycle proxy proposed by 
DeAngelo et al. (2006), and show that, in line with the conceptual framework of Filatotchev et al. (2006), 
governance does indeed change along the corporate life-cycle. We show that individual governance 
provisions (e.g. independence, accountability, transparency) are more relevant at different stages of the 
corporate life-cycle, but not necessarily the same stage. Since we show that overall governance, and more 
importantly the relevance of individual governance provisions vary along the corporate life-cycle, our 
results point to a flexible governance model which ensures that firms have sufficient freedom to adopt 
what they believe is the correct governance model for them. Previous literature finds that young, fast-
growing firms are likely to establish good corporate governance practices in order to attract external 
finance, increase profitability, and therefore create value for the firm. Our findings suggest that since 
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governance quality is greatest when firms are mature, greater resources are devoted to value preservation 
rather than value creation.      
Finally, given the nature of the governance data that we use, we are cognisant of the fact that the 
paper has limitations. These limitations are discussed in the introduction and elsewhere, and as such we 
do not deem it necessary to discuss them in great detail here again. While we cannot address the 
limitations in this paper, they do, nonetheless, provide a number of important insights and avenues for 
future research. It would be interesting to extend the sample coverage to a larger number of emerging and 
even developed market firms. We believe that it is important to extend the sample to include developed 
market firms since what we do know from the extant literature is that optimal governance is likely to be 
different between developed and emerging market firms (see Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009). To address 
some of the endogeneity issues, researchers should consider using governance data with a time-series 
dimension.  
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Table 1 
Sample Description 
 # Firms Firm Life-Cycle 
(RE/TA) 
Corporate 
Governance 
CL Country-Level Variables 
Country Firms MED 
 
SD 
 
MED 
 
SD 
 
 # CL MCAP SR CULT EC 
DEV 
Argentina 1 0.06 - 66.67 - 1 0.672 3 46 7,203 
Brazil 3 0.00 0.05 60.48 12.30 1 0.410 5 38 3,130 
Chile 7 0.11 0.13 62.40 4.18 3 0.890 5 23 4,636 
China 11 0.06 0.07 48.17 11.56 4 0.473 1 20 1,042 
Colombia 1 0.03 - 53.18 - 0 0.140 4 13 2,429 
Hong Kong 25 0.19 0.81 59.77 14.39 13 3.500 4 25 25,230 
Hungary 1 0.01 - 48.45 - 0 0.218 2 80 5,175 
India 13 0.10 0.14 53.43 10.42 3 0.272 4 48 460 
Indonesia 12 0.23 0.23 36.33 13.59 1 0.153 4 14 742 
Korea 13 0.01 0.15 39.68 5.85 3 0.423 4 18 10,655 
Malaysia 22 0.31 0.14 60.32 12.82 3 1.354 4 26 3,872 
Mexico 4 0.42 0.28 66.99 3.97 2 0.205 2 30 6,139 
Pakistan 4 0.02 0.02 33.58 20.25 0 0.081 5 14 490 
Peru 1 0.41 - 76.48 - 0 0.192 4 16 2,056 
Philippines 12 0.12 0.46 40.58 12.22 5 0.513 4 32 966 
Poland 1 0.14 - 37.73 - 0 0.155 2 60 4,979 
Singapore 18 0.14 0.30 67.42 6.74 5 1.608 4 20 22,027 
South Africa 16 0.15 0.27 64.27 16.09 7 1.259 5 65 2,638 
Taiwan 31 0.09 0.19 54.93 9.08 12 0.978 5 17 13,108 
Thailand 6 0.18 0.17 54.64 15.34 2 0.286 4 20 1,808 
Turkey 3 0.16 0.09 50.65 5.13 1 0.409 4 37 3,037 
 205 0.15 0.36 55.82 14.70 66     
This table describes the sample by country. We report the median (MED) and standard deviation (SD) of firm life-cycle and 
corporate governance, respectively. Firm life-cycle is measured using the ratio of earned equity (retained earnings) to total assets 
(RE/TA). # CL is the number of firms cross-listed in the U.S. All information on cross-listed firms is sourced from the Bank of 
New York Mellon and Citibank. In the remaining columns, we report the country-level variables. 
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Table 2 
Corporate Governance Provisions 
 # 
Firms 
Discipline 
(DIS) 
Transparency 
(TPY) 
Independence 
(IND) 
Accountability 
(ACC) 
Responsibility 
(RES) 
Fairness 
(FAIR) 
Country Firms MED 
 
SD 
 
MED 
 
SD 
 
MED 
 
SD 
 
MED 
 
SD 
 
MED 
 
SD 
 
MED 
 
SD 
 
Argentina 1 66.70 - 70.00 - 78.60 - 62.50 - 50.00 - 72.20 - 
Brazil 3 55.60 23.16 80.00 15.28 42.90 18.88 75.00 19.09 83.30 28.87 33.30 5.55 
Chile 7 55.60 5.99 90.00 19.52 64.30 15.67 37.50 6.10 83.30 8.10 83.30 7.68 
China 11 33.30 16.48 60.00 12.93 64.30 22.78 12.50 19.73 50.00 13.11 83.30 26.80 
Colombia 1 55.60 - 50.00 - 35.70 - 50.00 - 50.00 - 77.80 - 
Hong Kong 25 44.40 24.25 70.00 16.10 42.90 28.75 50.00 25.26 83.30 18.18 83.30 17.67 
Hungary 1 22.20 - 60.00 - 57.10 - 12.50 - 66.70 - 72.20 - 
India 13 66.70 16.90 50.00 14.81 64.30 29.41 50.00 18.40 50.00 16.13 83.30 24.37 
Indonesia 12 33.30 18.02 60.00 13.79 14.30 19.83 18.75 8.36 33.30 19.41 66.70 32.95 
Korea 13 33.30 9.99 50.00 7.51 35.70 13.87 62.50 17.22 33.30 10.67 33.30 23.30 
Malaysia 22 55.60 18.86 65.00 17.66 78.60 21.63 31.25 19.88 50.00 14.23 80.55 22.05 
Mexico 4 72.25 10.63 80.00 18.26 67.85 18.80 56.25 11.97 58.35 9.64 77.75 26.59 
Pakistan 4 27.75 26.47 31.65 19.66 50.00 26.76 36.10 26.61 27.75 26.47 22.25 8.31 
Peru 1 77.80 - 90.00 - 78.60 - 62.50 - 66.70 - 83.30 - 
Philippines 12 33.30 17.41 45.00 12.67 53.60 26.26 25.00 13.55 33.30 16.66 33.30 27.84 
Poland 1 11.10 - 20.00 - 78.60 78.60 100.0 - 16.70 - 0.00 - 
Singapore 18 66.70 19.50 70.00 14.47 85.70 11.75 50.00 17.68 66.70 13.86 88.90 16.46 
Sth Africa 16 55.60 13.76 50.00 18.97 71.40 25.59 75.00 23.48 66.70 21.08 80.55 23.20 
Taiwan 31 55.60 17.75 50.00 25.00 85.70 11.75 50.00 25.16 50.00 19.71 50.00 26.11 
Thailand 6 27.75 13.44 60.00 13.29 60.75 28.51 62.50 14.61 50.00 23.56 72.20 30.96 
Turkey 3 77.80 29.42 40.00 20.82 71.40 24.71 62.50 14.43 66.70 9.64 22.20 5.55 
 205 44.40 20.75 60.00 19.53 71.40 27.04 50.00 23.58 50.00 21.32 77.80 27.44 
This table reports the country sample median (MED) and standard deviation (SD) of discipline, transparency, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, and fairness, respectively. Corporate governance data is from CLSA (2001).  
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Table 3 
Life-Cycle Quartiles, Corporate Governance & Firm Characteristics 
 Life-Cycle (RE/TA) Quartiles 
 
 Quartile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
(Highest) 
High - Low 
# Firms 53 50 51 51  
Average RE/TA (0.157) 0.080 0.211 0.466 0.623*** 
Median RE/TA (0.003) 0.082 0.204 0.432 0.435*** 
Std. Deviation RE/TA 0.052 0.031 0.047 0.144 0.092*** 
 Life-Cycle Quartiles & Corporate Governance 
 
 Quartile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
(Highest) 
High - Low 
Average Governance 51.71 55.00 54.14 59.25 7.54*** 
Median Governance 51.68 52.05 55.42 61.95 10.27*** 
Std. Dev. Governance 16.56 13.74 12.45 14.82 (1.74) 
 Life-Cycle Quartiles & (Average) Individual Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
 Quartile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
(Highest) 
High - Low 
Discipline 43.39 49.55 50.54 53.82 10.43*** 
Transparency 61.49 55.47 51.57 62.16 0.67 
Independence 55.05 60.53 61.49 62.89 7.84*** 
Accountability 49.53 46.94 40.20 42.89 (6.64)*** 
Responsibility 47.48 50.11 53.92 61.44 13.96*** 
Fairness 53.03 67.44 67.10 72.32 19.29*** 
This table displays summary statistics by (RE/TA) quartile. The top panel displays the average, median, and standard 
deviation ratio of retained earnings to total assets, by quartile. The second panel displays the average, median, and 
standard deviation of corporate governance by ratio of earned equity (retained earnings) to total assets quartile. The 
third panel displays the average discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, and fairness, 
also by ratio of retained earnings to total assets quartile. Corporate governance is from CLSA (2001). *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level.          
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Table 4 
Corporate Governance and the Corporate Life-Cycle 
 Dependent Variable is Corporate Governance 
 Ordinary Least Squares  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Ec. Sig 
Life-Cycle 4.259* 
(1.88) 
2.971 
(1.36) 
4.630** 
(2.31) 
3.724* 
(1.88) 
4.785** 
(2.35) 
5.686*** 
(2.97) 
3.08 
Size 
 
-2.617*** 
(3.20) 
-3.818*** 
(4.63) 
-2.464*** 
(3.07) 
-3.594*** 
(4.54) 
-4.558*** 
(5.59) 
-4.242*** 
(5.35) 
10.53 
Growth 
 
7.926 
(1.36) 
6.352 
(1.08) 
  7.001 
(1.22) 
 2.40 
Profitability  
 
-4.514 
(0.49) 
3.673 
(0.45) 
  5.113 
(0.65) 
 1.01 
Cash 
 
12.424* 
(1.77) 
2.278 
(0.32) 
17.763*** 
(2.31) 
5.597 
(0.70) 
-0.594 
(0.09) 
3.345 
(0.43) 
1.88 
Dependence on External Finance 
 
  0.547** 
(2.20) 
0.181 
(0.81) 
 0.197 
(0.89) 
3.22 
U.S. Cross-Listing 
 
6.814*** 
(2.81) 
5.350*** 
(2.62) 
6.258*** 
(2.64) 
4.947** 
(2.40) 
6.807*** 
(3.14) 
6.251*** 
(2.81) 
6.07 
Stock Market Capitalization to GDP 
 
    -0.496 
(0.31) 
-0.472 
(0.29) 
0.97 
Shareholder Rights 
 
    -1.459 
(1.21) 
-1.242 
(1.04) 
2.56 
Culture 
 
    0.342*** 
(4.03) 
0.337*** 
(3.94) 
9.89 
Economic Development 
 
    6.443*** 
(4.95) 
 6.027*** 
(4.58) 
16.46 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included  
Country Dummies Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Excluded  
# Firms 205 205 205 205 205 205  
R-Squared 0.218 0.546 0.242 0.544 0.412 0.408  
 Weighted Least Squares  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Ec. Sig 
Life-Cycle  7.504** 
(2.04) 
3.391 
(1.48) 
8.033*** 
(2.59) 
4.242** 
(2.14) 
7.665** 
(2.44) 
9.606*** 
(3.18) 
4.79 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included  
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included  
Country Dummies Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Excluded  
# Firms 205 205 205 205 205 205  
R-Squared 0.306 0.659 0.351 0.669 0.421 0.426  
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary and weighted least squares regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-
stats (absolute value) presented underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is 
corporate governance. All other variables are defined in appendix 1. An intercept, and a full set of industry and country 
dummies are included (where indicated) but not reported. Ec. Sig refers to the change in corporate governance resulting from a 
two standard deviation change in each independent variable, holding all else equal. The economic significance is calculated 
based on the average absolute coefficient estimate of each variable. Bold refers to variables which are statistically significant in 
at least one of the six regressions. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.         
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Table 5 
Individual Corporate Governance Provisions and the Corporate Life-Cycle 
 Dependent Variable is 
 DIS TPY IND ACC RES FAIR 
Life-Cycle 20.707*** 
(3.75) 
1.301 
(0.31) 
13.894** 
(1.98) 
1.544 
(0.24) 
5.903 
(1.58) 
14.583** 
(1.98) 
Size 
 
-4.224* 
(1.98) 
-3.759** 
(2.30) 
-6.296*** 
(3.90) 
-1.263 
(0.61) 
-4.372*** 
(3.13) 
-4.092* 
(1.78) 
Cash 
 
-6.059 
(0.35) 
-2.698 
(0.20) 
16.355 
(0.92) 
6.677 
(0.41) 
14.921 
(1.04) 
10.147 
(0.59) 
Dependence on External Finance 
 
1.021** 
(2.58) 
0.664** 
(2.32) 
0.620 
(1.26) 
0.247 
(0.62) 
0.501 
(1.31) 
0.482 
(1.36) 
U.S. Cross-Listing 
 
11.003* 
(1.81) 
12.027** 
(2.35) 
4.281 
(0.91) 
2.207 
(0.38) 
8.788** 
(2.08) 
16.411** 
(2.26) 
Stock Market Capitalization to GDP 
 
1.950 
(0.58) 
-3.354 
(1.11) 
-3.056 
(0.92) 
-10.219*** 
(2.71) 
0.885 
(0.33) 
9.951** 
(2.51) 
Shareholder Rights 
 
3.304 
(1.35) 
-0.171 
(0.07) 
-1.877 
(0.94) 
1.341 
(0.51) 
2.463 
(1.31) 
-3.499 
(1.17) 
Culture 
 
-0.060 
(0.35) 
-0.172 
(1.15) 
0.327*** 
(2.66) 
0.461** 
(1.97) 
0.127 
(0.90) 
-0.145 
(0.63) 
Economic Development 
 
1.884 
(0.72) 
5.756*** 
(2.65) 
9.127*** 
(4.10) 
7.735*** 
(2.77) 
5.132*** 
(2.62) 
-0.107 
(0.03) 
Ec. Sig. (Life-Cycle) 20.71 0.92 9.86 1.10 4.19 10.35 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
# Firms 205 205 205 205 205 205 
R-Squared 0.269 0.355 0.368 0.323 0.387 0.397 
 Dependent Variable is 
 DIS TPY IND ACC RES FAIR 
Life-Cycle 13.001*** 
(3.21) 
-6.323 
(1.00) 
3.872 
(0.67) 
-2.606 
(0.34) 
7.143** 
(2.05) 
10.601 
(1.62) 
Size 
 
-2.403 
(1.46) 
-2.957** 
(2.24) 
-4.622*** 
(2.73) 
-1.862 
(1.21) 
-4.183*** 
(3.21) 
-2.694 
(1.33) 
Cash 
 
-0.686 
(0.06) 
8.447 
(0.69) 
23.301 
(1.28) 
13.845 
(1.01) 
19.930 
(1.46) 
26.062 
(1.62) 
Dependence on External Finance 
 
0.553* 
(1.72) 
0.686** 
(2.54) 
0.403 
(0.87) 
0.802** 
(2.08) 
0.309 
(0.72) 
0.360 
(1.14) 
U.S. Cross-Listing 
 
2.016 
(0.51) 
5.304 
(1.61) 
0.897 
(0.18) 
3.294 
(1.09) 
4.364 
(1.38) 
7.985** 
(1.99) 
Ec. Sig. (Life-Cycle) 9.23 (4.49) 2.75 (1.85) 5.07 7.53 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 205 205 205 205 205 205 
R-Squared 0.643 0.648 0.552 0.691 0.619 0.663 
This table reports coefficient estimates from weighted least squares regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented 
underneath in parenthesis. In the weighted least squares regressions, the weight of each observation (firm) is the inverse of the 
number of observations (firms) in each country. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is discipline 
(DIS), transparency (TPY), independence (IND), accountability (ACC), responsibility (RES), and fairness (FAIR), as indicated. 
Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). All other variables are defined in appendix 1. An intercept, and a full 
set of industry and country dummies are included (where indicated) but not reported. Ec. Sig refers to the change in corporate 
governance resulting from a two standard deviation change in retained earnings, holding all else equal. The economic 
significance is calculated based on the average absolute coefficient estimate of retained earnings. Bold refers to variables which 
are statistically significant in at least one of the six regressions. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, 
respectively.                       
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Table 6 
Individual Corporate Governance Provisions and the Corporate Life-Cycle 
  Dependent Variable is 
 Corporate 
Governance 
DIS TPY IND ACC RES FAIR 
Life-Cycle Q2 
 
0.448 
(0.14) 
-0.231 
(0.04) 
-6.700* 
(1.85) 
6.956 
(1.23) 
-8.102* 
(1.91) 
-3.389 
(0.64) 
14.364*** 
(3.04) 
Life-Cycle Q3 
 
0.770 
(0.29) 
7.993 
(1.32) 
-14.102*** 
(3.42) 
4.964 
(0.93) 
-9.733** 
(2.39) 
5.640 
(1.24) 
10.036* 
(1.87) 
Life-Cycle Q4 2.016* 
(1.69) 
8.850* 
(1.65) 
-11.808*** 
(2.64) 
10.566* 
(1.85) 
-10.469** 
(2.57) 
4.453 
(0.95) 
10.519 
(1.57) 
        
Size 
 
-3.069*** 
(3.45) 
-2.328 
(1.51) 
-2.100* 
(1.70) 
-5.133*** 
(3.03) 
-1.003 
(0.62) 
-3.966*** 
(3.07) 
-3.837* 
(1.95) 
Cash 
 
16.021* 
(1.79) 
-0.722 
(0.06) 
15.037 
(1.18) 
17.668 
(0.95) 
20.884 
(1.52) 
20.094 
(1.47) 
22.837 
(1.44) 
Dep. on Ext. Finance 
 
0.525* 
(1.72) 
0.547 
(1.53) 
0.841*** 
(2.73) 
0.342 
(0.74) 
0.939** 
(2.39) 
0.324 
(0.71) 
0.148 
(0.45) 
U.S. Cross-Listing 
 
3.921* 
(1.84) 
1.226 
(0.32) 
5.977* 
(1.94) 
0.616 
(0.12) 
3.632 
(1.22) 
3.556 
(1.19) 
8.556** 
(2.25) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
R-Squared 0.666 0.643 0.679 0.564 0.707 0.628 0.677 
This table reports coefficient estimates from weighted least squares regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented 
underneath in parenthesis. In the weighted least squares regressions, the weight of each observation (firm) is the inverse of the 
number of observations (firms) in each country. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is corporate 
governance, or either of its components, as indicated. The reference group is Retained Earnings 1 (Quartile 1, the lowest 
quartile). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001).  All other 
variables are defined in appendix 1. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. An intercept, and 
a full set of industry and country dummies are included (where indicated) but not reported.  
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Appendix 1 
Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
Corporate Governance 
 
Equally-weighted composite measure of six distinct 
governance categories, namely management 
discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, and fairness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
All CLSA (2001) 
Discipline (DIS) Reflects public commitment to CG and financial 
discipline.   
Transparency (TPY) Reflects the ability of outsiders to assess the true 
position of a company. 
Independence (IND) Reflects whether the board is independent of 
controlling shareholders and is separate from senior 
management. 
Accountability (ACC) Designed to capture the proper accountability of 
management to the board. 
Responsibility (RES) Record of taking measures in case of 
mismanagement. 
Fairness (FAIR) Records treatment of minorities. 
Life-Cycle Earned Equity (Retained Earnings) to Total Assets   
 
 
 
 
All Worldscope 
Size Log of book assets in US$ 
Growth Logarithmic one-year asset growth 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to book 
assets 
Cash Cash scaled by book assets 
Dep. On External Finance Capital expenditure less cashflow from operation 
scaled by capital expenditure 
Dividend Payout Dividends to Total Assets 
Cross-Listing 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. Bank of New York, 
Citibank.  
Shareholder Rights  From Spamann (2010) and Djankov et al. (DLLS) 
(2008) (for China, Hungary, and Poland where 
Spamann (2010 is unavailable). The index of DLLS 
(2008) ranges from 1 (weak shareholder rights) to 5 
(strong shareholder rights). The Spamann (2010) 
index ranges from 2 to 5 (using 1997 values).  
Spamann (2010) & 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
Stock Market Capitalization Stock Market Capitalization to GDP (in 2001) Updated version of Beck 
et al. (2000) 
Culture “Individualism” from Hofstede (2001) Hofstede (2001) 
Economic Development GDP per capita in US$ World Bank and IMF 
Industry Dummies Industry dummies based on four-digit SIC codes.  Worldscope 
Country Dummies Country dummies. Argentina is the reference country Author Calculations 
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